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points in relationship to the number of 
instructions in the program." Apple, 
714 F.2d at 1245. Franklin defended, 
however, that the operating programs 
were not copyrightable; first, because 
they are embedded on a micro~chip and 
are therefore a form of machinery and 
second, because they cannot be distin~ 
guished from the concept of operating 
the computer system, they are more 
than the mere expression of an idea. 
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 102 
(1976). 
Both of Franklin's arguments were 
rejected by the court which reasoned 
that the programs do not meet the 
requirements of the Copyright Act of 
1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. The 
programs are "literary works," and they 
are "fixed in [a] tangible medium of 
expression." Id. at § 102(a). The court 
went on to hold that "the medium is not 
the message" and the fact that a program 
is recorded on a device which is part of 
the machinery is a mere change in the 
tangible form. Apple, 714 F .2d at 1251. 
In response to Franklin's second argu~ 
ment that an operating system is a mere 
method of operation and not protected, 
the court relied on Congress's Commis~ 
sion on New Technological Uses report 
which stated "[t]hat the words of a 
program are used ultimately in the 
implementation of a process should in 
no way affect their copyrightability." id. 
The court also found that Apple was 
seeking only to copyright the instructions 
and not the computer operating method. 
With the growing number of personal 
computers in businesses and private 
homes throughout the United States, 
this decision protects not only large 
computer companies such as Apple, but 
also the individual computer operator 
who creates hislher own operating 
program. ~ 
by Sylvia Halkousis 
LACK OF JURY 
IMPARTIALITY REQUIRED 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
I n McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, _ U.S. _ (1984), the United States Supreme Court 
clarified the bases upon which a motion 
for new trial made as a result of a juror's 
failure to disclose information on voir 
dire will be granted. To prevail upon 
such a motion, a party must show that a 
juror's answer to a material question on 
voir dire was dishonest and that had the 
juror answered honestly, grounds estab~ 
lishing a challenge for cause would have 
been present. 
In McDonough Power, Billy Greenwood 
and his parents brought suit against 
McDonough Power Equipment Incor~ 
porated to recover damages for injuries 
sustained by Billy when his feet came in 
contact with the blades of a riding lawn 
mower manufactured by McDonough, 
Inc. During voir dire, prospective jurors 
were asked if they or any of their family 
members had ever sustained a severe 
injury. One individual, who eventually 
became a member of the jury, failed to 
respond to this question. After the trial, 
the United States District Court entered 
judgment upon a jury verdict for 
McDonough, Inc. 
After entry of the judgment, the 
Greenwoods requested and received 
permission to approach the jurors in an 
attempt to elicit information regarding 
injuries sustained by them or members 
of their families. Despite discovery of 
evidence that a juror had not disclosed 
information regarding such injuries, the 
district court denied the Greenwood's 
motion for a new trial, stating that the 
jury verdict was fair and well~supported. 
The Greenwoods appealed to the 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
which reversed the district court judg~ 
ment. In Greenwood v. McDonough Power 
Equipment, Inc., 687 F.2d338 (10th Cir. 
1982), the court of appeals held that the 
Greenwood's right of per~emptory 
challenge had been prejudiced because 
of the juror's failure to respond to a 
question on voir dire. To cure the error 
of the juror's "probable bias," a new 
trial was granted. The Supreme Court 
however, reversed, holding that a new 
trial will not be granted unless a juror's 
nondisclosure results in a partial jury. 
The court's opinion begins by tracing 
the legislative and judicial history of the 
harmless error rules. These rules were 
adopted to curb the abuses of appellate 
review procedures because at one time 
"courts of review tower[ ed] above the 
trials... as impregnable citadels of 
technicality" with trials representing 
attempts to get reversible error on the 
record. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 
U.S. 750, 759 (1946). The effect of the 
harmless error rules is that courts, in 
their judgment, can disregard errors in 
the proceeding which do not interfere 
with the fairness of the trial. 
continued on page 24 
RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME 
F or the first time in Maryland, a trial court has held that expert testimony on the victim's emo~ 
tional trauma is admissible in a rape 
case to show the victim did not consent 
to intercourse. State v. Allewalt, docket 
No. 83~CR~2517 (Circuit Court for 
Baltimore County November 4, 1983). 
Relying on consent as his defense, 
Allewalt was convicted of rape after a 
psychiatrist described the symptoms 
the complainant suffered, and testified 
that they were attributable to the 
emotional condition known as rape 
trauma syndrome. 
Rape trauma syndrome is a specific 
type of stress disorder which arises 
from the emotional impact of being 
raped. The symptoms most commonly 
associated with rape trauma syndrome 
include fear of men in general, fear of 
being alone, fear of being raped again, 
disturbance in sleep habits, loss of 
appetite, depression, and a sense of 
shame. 
Without the support of expert 
testimony on rape trauma syndrome, 
the defense of consent was often 
difficult to disprove because of lack of 
physical evidence. Many times the 
decision in such a case would be based 
solely on the testimony of the com~ 
plainant and defendant; therefore, the 
credibility of each testimony was 
critical in the determination of the 
outcome. By allowing the expert to 
testify, the complainant's testimony 
that she did not consent to intercourse 
can be corroborated by the testimony 
of a psychiatrist. Rape trauma testimony, 
therefore, could significantly strengthen 
the prosecution's case. 
Only a handful of states have directly 
decided the issue of admissibility of rape 
trauma syndrome. Minnesota, the only 
state with more than one decision on 
point, has held that the admission of 
expert testimony on rape trauma 
syndrome is reversible error. State v. 
Fall, 1984/The Law Forum-ll 
Sex-Based Mortality Tables 
continued from page I4 
IV. 
One of the main purposes of Title VII 
is to "make persons whole for injuries 
suffered on account of unlawful employ-
ment discrimination." Albemarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 
( 1975). Moody illustrated the existence 
of a strong presumption in favor of 
retroactive relief for Title VII violations, 
and Manhart stressed that the presump-
tion was one that could seldom be 
overcome. Upon examination of the 
relief afforded Norris by the district 
court below, which affected only those 
benefit payments made after the date of 
its judgment, the Supreme Court found 
that such an award was inconsistent with 
the presumption elicited in Moody and 
recognized in Manhart. 
Before remanding the issue to the 
district court, the Supreme Court 
suggested that the lower court give more 
attention to the fact that, before 
Manhart, the use of sex-based tables 
might reasonably have been assumed to 
be lawful. In addition, the Court noted 
that the decision in Manhart should have 
put the defendants on notice that a man 
and a woman who make the same 
contributions to a retirement plan must 
be paid the same monthly benefits. 
Therefore, the lower court should 
examine whether the defendants, after 
Manhart, could have applied sex-neutral 
tables to the pre-Manhart contributions 
made by the plaintiff, Norris, and a 
similarly situated male employee with-
out violating any contractual rights that 
the latter might have had on the basis of 
his pre-Manhart contributions. Norris, 
103 S.Ct. at 3503-04. If the defendants 
could have done this, they should have 
in order to prevent further discrimina-
tion, and it would therefore be equitable 
that defendants be required to supple-
ment any benefits coming due after the 
district court's judgment by whatever 
sum necessary to "make Norris whole." 
Id. 
V. 
Justice Powell, joined by three other 
justices, dissented as to the defendants' 
liability, basing his assertation on the 
premises that sex-based mortality tables 
reflect objective actuarial standards and 
employee classification on the basis of 
sex in reference to life expectancy is a 
"nonstigmatizing factor that demon-
strably differentiates females from males 
and that is not measurable on an 
individual basis .... " Norris, 103 S.Ct. at 
3509. 
24-The Law Forum/Fall, I984 
The dissent further warned that the 
potential effect of the majority's holding 
would be to: 1) deny employees the 
opportunity to purchase life annuities at 
lower costs because (a) the cost to 
employers of offering unisex annuities is 
prohibitive, or (b) insurance carriers 
would not choose to write such 
annuities; 2) inflict the heavy cost 
burden of equalizing benefits sustained 
by those insurance companies and 
employers choosing to offer such on 
current employees; and 3) have a 
disruptive impact on the operation of an 
employer's pension plan as an unfore-
seen contingency jeopardizing the in-
surer's solvency and the insured's 
benefits. Id. 
The potential effect of the majority's 
holding on insurance companies and 
employers has yet to be fully observed. 
Nonetheless, it is now clearly established 
that an employer or insurer can no 
longer fashion his personal policies on 
the basis of assumptions about the 
differences between men and women 
previously believed to be valid. W 
by Robert J. Farley 
Lack of Jury Impartiality 
continued from page I I 
In 1919, the Judicial Code, § 269 (28 
U.S.c. § 391) espoused the principle 
that on any appeal, a court was to 
examine the trial record "without regard 
to technical errors, defects, or excep-
tions which do not affect the substantial 
rights of the parties." The essence of this 
provision was incorportaed in Rule 61 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This harmless error provision instructs 
the district courts that throughout a trial 
proceeding judges "must disregard any 
error which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties." 
(emphasis added). Support for this 
principle can be found in De Santa v. 
Nehi Corp., 171 F.2d 696 (2d. Cir. 
1948), where the court held that it is 
considered best practice for appellate 
courts to act in accordance with the 
mandate of Rule 61. The principle of 
Rule 61 was ultimately codified by 
Congress to be specifically applied to 
appellate courts in 28 U.S.c. §2111 
(1949). 
In McDonough Power, the Supreme 
Court noted that a fair trial requires an 
impartial trier of fact-U[ a] jury capable 
and willing to decide the case solely on 
the evidence before it," Smith v. Phillips, 
455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) and that an 
important safeguard of jury impartiality 
is the voir dire examination. The court 
held that in order to uphold the due 
process requirement of impartiality, 
prospective jurors must answer honestly 
questions posed to them. 
With these principles in mind, the 
Supreme Court reviewed the varied 
responses given by prospective jurors in 
McDonough when the history of severe 
injuries question was posed. The range 
of responses indicated that each juror 
interpreted the question differently; 
some jurors' responses revealed injuries 
resulting from minor incidents while 
other jurors' responses failed to disclose 
injuries resulting from serious accidents. 
The court acknowledged that even 
though the jurors were mistaken by 
failing to disclose various injuries 
sustained by their family members, their 
responses were honest in light of their 
interpretation of the voir dire question. 
The Supreme Court held that the 
policy of judicial management, evidenced 
by the harmless error rules of disregard-
ing errors that do not interfere with the 
fairness of a trial, must be upheld 
because the importance of trial finality 
outweighs evidence of trial imperfection. 
To effect the policy behind the harmless 
error rules, the court adopted the 
following two-part test to evaluate the 
propriety of granting a motion for a new 
trial based on lack of information 
received from a juror on voir dire 
examinations: (1) "a party must first 
demonstrate that a juror failed to answer 
honestly a material question on voir 
dire" and (2) "that a correct response 
would have provided a valid basis for a 
challenge for cause." _U.S. _,_. 
There are two concurring opinions in 
McDonough Power. Justice O'Connor 
concurred with the majority, holding 
that "honesty of a juror's response is the 
best initial indicator of whether the 
juror in fact was impartia1." _ U.S. 
-, _. However, Justice O'Connor's 
concurrence is written with the view that 
the ultimate determinations regarding 
the existence of juror bias and the need 
for a new trial remain within the trial 
court's discretion. 
In the second concurrence, Justice 
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, 
agreed with the majority's result but 
asserted a different test to evaluate the 
granting of a motion for a new trial based 
on lack of information by a juror on voir 
dire examination. Justice Brennan's test 
focuses on a juror's bias, not his 
honesty, and requires a party seeking a 
new trial to demonstrate that: (1) "the 
juror incorrectly responded to a material 
question on voir dire" and (2) "the 
juror was biased against the moving 
litigant." _ U.S. --> __ In deter~ 
mining whether the juror was biased 
against the moving litigant, Justice 
Brennan wrote that the honesty or 
dishonesty of the response and whether 
the incorrect response was made inten~ 
tionally or inadvertently are two factors 
that must be considered. 
The Supreme Court's decision in 
McDonough Power places more impor~ 
tance on the value of trial finality than 
on the value of trial perfection through 
the adoption of its two~part test used in 
evaluating the granting of a motion for a 
new trial because of a juror's failure to 
disclose information on voir dire 
examination. By leaving room for 
harmless error at the trial level, the 
Court further eliminates the possibilities 
of battles of technicality as potential 
grounds for a new trial, promotes and 
upholds the policy of judicial efficiency, 
and ensures substantially just and 
equitable results in trial proceedings by 
demanding an impartial jury. m 
by Deborah Zgorski 
Antenuptial Agreements 
continued from page 13 
consonant with the needs of contem~ 
porary society, a court ... has ... the duty 
to re~examine its precedents rather than 
to apply by rote an antiquated formula." 
Id. at 258~59, 462 A.2d at 514 (quoting 
Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 351 
N.E.2d 526, 532 (1976)). The court 
proceeded to evaluate precedent in light 
of Maryland's present public policy. 
The court noted that antenuptial 
agreements in contemplation of death 
were treated differently from antenuptial 
agreements in contemplation of divorce; 
the former is permitted when validly 
executed. For an agreement which 
contemplates death to be valid several 
factors must be considered; these will be 
discussed later. See Hartz v. Hartz, 248 
Md. 47, 234 A.2d 865 (1967). How~ 
ever, in Cohn v. Cohn, 209 Md. 470, 121 
A.2d 704 (1956), the court held that 
antenuptial agreements in contempla~ 
tion of separation or divorce were void 
as against public policy. This holding 
was based on two reasons. The first 
was that the state's interest in pre~ 
serving the marriage would be defeated 
by an antenuptial agreement which 
would induce divorce. Id. at 475~76, 
121 A.2d 706~07. The wife might 
become a ward of the state if the 
agreement did not satisfy the husband's 
obligations. The second reason was that 
the agreement would be abused in states 
where divorce was based on marital fault 
because the husband could force his wife 
to bring an action by abusing her and 
thus limiting the amount he would have 
to pay. Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tex. App. 
594,385 S.W.2d 288 (1964). Maryland 
has both fault and no fault divorce but 
followed this reasoning because it was 
unanimously accepted by other states. 
In evaluating these rationales the Frey 
court looked to other jurisdictions and 
current Maryland law. 
In other jurisdictions, the prohibition 
against antenuptial agreements has been 
abandoned. These jurisdictions assert 
that there is little evidence to support 
the view that antenuptial agreements 
induce divorce. Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. 
App.2d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972). 
The courts also recognize that the roles 
of husband and wife have changed over 
the years. The wife is now less likely to 
become a ward of the state since women 
have become more prevalent in the work 
place and have the necessary skills to 
carryon after a divorce. Another reason 
for abandoning the prohibition is that 
the state has no interest in preserving a 
marriage which has deteriorated to a 
point beyond hope. In addition, a 
majority of the states allow no~fault 
divorces including Maryland under Md. 
Ann. Code art. 16, § 8824~25 (1981). 
Furthermore, the Maryland General 
Assembly has indicated that Maryland's 
present public policy recognizes these 
agreements, and therefore they cannot 
be against public policy. The General 
Assembly enacted the Marital Property 
Act, 11978 Md. Laws 794, which 
pertains to property distribution upon 
divorce. Maryland Code (1974, 1980 
Repl. Vol.) Cts. &Jud. Proc. Article, 3~ 
6A~01(c), (e) allows the parties to 
determine what will be considered 
marital property. Since the General 
Assembly permits antenuptial agreements 
that dispose of property upon divorce 
and since the state law's function is to 
express public policy, the Frey court 
decided that Cohn v. Cohn, 209 Md. 
470, 121 A.2d 704 (1956), must be 
overruled. 
However, antenuptial agreements in 
contemplation of divorce are not 
automatically valid. Hartz v. Hartz, 248 
Md. 47, 234 A.2d 865 (1967), sets out 
the tests and factors to be used in 
determining whether the agreement is 
valid. Id. at 56~59, 234 A.2d 870~ 73. It 
must be fair and equitable. There also 
must be full and truthful disclosure of all 
assets. Id. at 56, 234 A.2d 871. The 
parties must enter into the agreement 
voluntarily and fully realize its meaning 
and effect. Id. at 56~57, 234 A.2d 870~ 
71. Independent legal advice is also 
important. Id. at 60, 234 A.2d 873. In 
determining if there is overreaching, the 
court should look at the following 
factors: ages of the parties, income, 
obligations and ties, needs of the 
relinquishing party, and circumstances 
leading to the execution of the agreement. 
Id. at 58~59, 872. The agreement will be 
valid only if these tests have been met. 
Justice Smith concurred in part and 
dissented in part. He dissented from the 
holding that the agreement was not 
valid. Justice Smith believes that public 
policy allows premarital agreements but 
only to the extent that they do not waive 
alimony. In his opinion, Maryland Code 
(1974, 1980 Repl. Vol.), Cts. & Jud. 
Proc. Article, 3~6A~01(c), (e) does not 
concern alimony, but only such property 
acquired during the marriage~family use 
personal property. Justice Smith stated 
that the state's interest is to make sure 
the marriage tie is not "lightly" broken; 
and now that either spouse may be 
required to pay alimony, the public 
policy is needed more than ever. 
The court's decision does not apply to 
all antenuptial agreements but it is 
limited to those agreements which 
concern property and financial obliga~ 
tions. Agreements which attempt to 
limit the duty of a spouse to support the 
other spouse or which provide that the 
spouse does not have to support the 
children may be against public policy. ~ 
by Kathleen Runyon 
Fall, 1984/The Law Forum-25 
